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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

p. H. INVESTMENT,
Case No.

Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

890357

Priority 13

CATHY OLIVER,

:

Defendant/Petitioner.

:

BRIEF OF PETITIONER

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code $78-2-2(3)(a) and (5). This is a review of a decision
by the Utah Court of Appeals by writ of certiorari.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether a tenant is entitled to raise contract defenses

in an unlawful detainer action seeking unpaid rent to compensate
her

for the

landlord's violation of Salt Lake City housing

ordinances•
2.

Whether an implied warranty of habitability exists in

Utah residential rental agreements.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code. S78-36-3 to 10; Salt Lake City Ordinances S5-11-1
(recodified during this appeal at S18.48.010).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an unlawful detainer action by a landlord against a
tenant based upon non-payment of rent.

The landlord's complaint

sought a writ of restitution and a judgment for rent owed and
treble damages based upon Utah Code §78-36*3 to 10.
The case was tried to the Honorable Robert C. Gibson, judge
of the Fifth Circuit Court for Salt Lake County* He granted
judgment to landlord against tenant of $80.36 for rent, treble
damages of $630.00, and costs of court of $19.35, together with an
Order of Restitution of the premises.

Tenant received an offset

of $200.00 against this judgment for her deposit (R. 54, T. 59).
The

court

dismissed

tenant's

rent

rebate

counterclaim

with

prejudice.
At the trial, William Cupit, a Housing Officer with Salt Lake
City Building and Housing Services, testified that there were
forty-two violations of Salt Lake City ordinances which adopted
the Uniform Housing Code and the Uniform Code for the Abatement of
Dangerous Buildings. These violations included numerous serious
electrical violations, a hazardous stairway without handrails,
holes in the walls in every room, dilapidated and rotted floors and
carpets, a collapsed bathroom ceiling, a collapsed bedroom ceiling,
leaking faucets, shower and toilets, broken and missing windows,
lack of bathroom door, and inadequate protection from weather (T.
30-33, Ex. D-l). Cupit had found the building to be substandard
and dangerous, declared it to be a public nuisance and ordered it
repaired or demolished (T. 33,R.46). The tenant argued she owed no
rent and additionally sought a rebate of rent paid based on the
numerous conditions that violated Salt Lake City Ordinances S5-111 (R. 5-6), namely the Uniform Housing Code and the Uniform Code
2

for the Abatement of Dangerous Buildings.
The trial court gave three reasons for enforcing the rent due
under the

lease, awarding

treble damages under the unlawful

detainer statute and for refusing any rent rebate or any damages
due to the landlord's violations of the law:
1.

The court should not interfere in the contractual
arrangement entered into by tenant and landlord.

2.

A tenant is not entitled to any rent offset or damages
for landlord's breach of an implied warranty of
habitability because the Utah Supreme Court has never
delineated such a defense or cause of action.

3.

Tenant waived any defense or cause of action under a
theory of warranty of habitability by agreeing to rent
the premises in their deteriorated condition (R. 47,
T. 59).

The Court of Appeals affirmed by a divided court, stating that
although the existing law "badly needs reform," P.H. Investment v.
Oliver. 778 P.2d 11, 14 (Utah App. 1989) and that the -rules
employed

in cases such as this, so lacking in rationale and

justification, cannot be allowed to continue indefinitely,- 778
P.2d at 14, the Court would take no action and deferred to the
legislature, citing the lack of complete information and a fear of
developing case law in -fits and starts.- 778 P.2d at 13, n.8.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Garff

agreed with the

analysis of the majority that the law was antiquated but concluded
that there was no reason to continue to defer to the legislature

3

which has failed to take any action for many years and opined that
the

court

habitability

should

judicially

to avoid

adopt

continued

an

implied

violations

of

warranty

of

principles

of

fundamental fairness and to "avert future human suffering and
tragedy-. 778 P.2d at 16.
The matter now comes before this court for a determination of
tenant's remedies for landlord's breach of the housing codes,
whether a warranty of habitability is implied in Utah rental
agreements, and whether the breach thereof constitutes a defense
to an unlawful detainer action and justifies a rent rebate to
tenant•
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
By operation of law, housing codes are made a part of all
rental agreements in Utah. Here the landlord has breached his
rental contract by flagrant violations of these codes. This court
should delineate the contract remedies available to tenant.
The vast majority of states has adopted the implied warranty
of habitability and has allowed it as a defense in unlawful
detainer actions.

This Court should join those other states by

articulating this doctrine

in Utah, reverse

the trial court

decision and award tenant a rent rebate to compensate her for
landlord's breach of this warranty.

4

ARGUMENT
POINT I
AN IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY IN RESIDENTIAL
RENTAL AGREEMENTS HAS BEEN ADOPTED IN MOST STATES
AND SHOULD BE JUDICIALLY ADOPTED IN UTAH.
The trial court based its decision on an application of the
doctrine of caveat emptor (or more exactly, caveat lessee) in
rental agreements. The appeals court opinion explicitly determined
that caveat emptor applies to landlord/tenant relationships. This
concept

has

reflecting

been
the

nearly

universally

realities

rejected

underlying

relationship in modern society.

the

as

no

longer

landlord/tenant

Instead, the majority of states

has turned to the concept of implied warranty of habitability.
An implied warranty of habitability has three elements.

The

first is that the warranty exists by implication in all residential
landlord/tenant agreements to the effect that the premises are fit
for their intended use—human occupancy.

Habitability is

frequently measured by compliance with housing and health codes.
Second, the landlord's warranty and the tenant's covenant to pay
rent are mutually dependent. And third, the breach of the warranty
by the landlord justifies the tenant in suspending the payment of
rent.

In turn, the breach of warranty is a defense to an action

by a landlord for non-payment of rent.
The

existence

of

a

warranty

of

habitability

derives

historically from combining principles of property, contract, and
tort law, as developed below.

It prevails in a majority of

5

jurisdictions in this country today.
A.

The Historical Basis for Applying Caveat
wmp-hnT- No Longer Exists in Modern Society.

Courts

adopting

the

implied

warranty

of

habitability

inevitably begin with a discussion of the anachronistic

caveat

emptor doctrine in today's society. The U. S. Court of Appeals for
the D. C. Circuit wrote in Javins v. First National Realty Corp..
428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970):
Since, in traditional analysis, a lease was the
conveyance of an interest in land, courts have
usually utilized the special rules governing
real property transactions to resolve
controversies involving leases. However, as
the Supreme Court has noted in another context,
the body of private property law . . ., more
than almost any other branch of law, has been
shaped by distinctions whose validity is
largely historical.
Courts have a duty to
reappraise old doctrines in the light of the
facts and values of contemporary life
particularly old common law doctrines which the
courts themselves created and developed
(footnote omitted).
The history of the landlord's maintenance duties returns us
to the Norman Conquest, when the land was divided into great
estates ruled by lords.1

With the advent of the landlord's

Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment in the fifteenth century came the
creation

of

relationship.

a new

social

institution

-

the

landlord/tenant

The chief duty of the landlord was a negative one:

M

to keep his overseer away from the premises while the tenant had

the right to occupy and farm the land."2 This negative covenant of
non-interference changed to an affirmative duty in the nineteenth

1

See Bovle, The LanriinrH^s warranty of Habitabilitv:
for Statutory Reform. 1984 Fla. Bar J. 509.

Id.
6

A Plea

century with the change of life occasioned by the industrial
revolution.

In Edwards v. Etherincrton. 171 Eng. Rep. 1016 (1825),

the court introduced the concept of an affirmative duty to see to
structural repairs of the leased premises.
expanded

this

new

concept.3

The

result

A series of cases
was

the

continued

development of an inference of a warranty of habitability in the
residential landlord/tenant relationship until the Housing Act of
1925, which provided

statutorily

for an implied warranty of

habitability in the lease of every residence in London where the
rent did not exceed forty pounds.
American courts, unfortunately, followed the common law in
England only up to the 18th century. Although England progressed,
courts in the United States continued to insulate the landlord from
liability.

It was not until the 1970 's that courts were willing

to look beyond the frozen doctrine of caveat emptor associated with
agrarian England.
Various factors have influenced courts in shedding the old
baggage.

First, courts began to recognize the changed shelter

needs of the modern urban dweller.

One of the first courts to

recognize the need for change noted that

N

[w]hen American city

dwellers • • • seek * shelter' today, they seek a well known package
of goods and services - a package which includes • • • adequate
heat, light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities,

3

See Collins v. Barrow, 174 Eng. Rep. 38 (1831) (tenant held
justified in abandoning leased dwellings that suffered from lack
of proper drainage); Smith v. Marrable, 152 Eng. Rep. 693 (1843)
("in point of law every house must be taken to be let upon the
implied condition that there was nothing about it so noxious as to
render it uninhabitable").

7

secure

windows

maintenance."

and

doors,

proper

sanitation,

and

proper

Javins. 428 F.2d at 1074 (cited by this Court in

Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723, 727 (Utah 1985)).
Second, the lack of adequate housing has caused unequal
bargaining positions, leaving tenants with little leverage to
enforce a request for improved housing conditions.

"[E]ven when

defects are apparent the low income tenant frequently has no
realistic

alternative

but

to

accept

such

housing

with

the

expectation that the landlord will make the necessary repairs."
Green v. Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco.
Ill Cal. Rptr. 704, 517 P.2d 1168, 1174 (1974).4
Third, the agrarian doctrine assumed equal skill, incentives
and resources between the landlord and the tenant in discerning or
remedying any problems with the land and simple buildings.

In

modern society, it is the landlord who has the superior knowledge
and financial capability required to maintain the leased premises.
Many potential or actual defects are not readily apparent or are
difficult or expensive to remedy, particularly in large buildings.
The Florida Supreme Court noted that "we now live in an age where
the complexities of housing construction place the landlord in a
much better position to guard against dangerous conditions."
Mansur v. Eubanks, 401 So.2d 1328, 1330 (Fla. 1981).
Fourth,

courts

have

analogized

relationship to the seller/consumer
Uniform Commercial

the

context

landlord/tenant
and utilized the

Code's implied warranty of merchantability

4

See Note, The Implied Warranty of Habitabilitv:
Deferred. 48 UMKC L. Rev. 237, 240 (1980).
Q

A Dream

theory to hold landlords responsible for providing a product
suitable for the intended use.

The Missouri appellate court

observed that the tenant's lack of knowledge of the true condition
of the leased premises rendered him just as vulnerable as if he had
purchased an automobile. King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 73 (Mo.
App. 1973).
Fifth, many courts have looked to the widespread enactment of
housing

and building

codes as a major change,

responsibilities on landlords.

imposing

new

See Petling v. Edelbrock, 671

S.W.2d 265, 269 (Mo. 1984).
Modern courts, recognizing these factors, have abandoned the
outmoded doctrine of law based on agrarian reality, and have
adopted implied warranties of habitability.
B.

The Majority of States Today Recognizes an
Implied Warranty of Habitability. Either
Statutorily or Judicially Imposed.

Forty-two states and the District of Columbia have adopted the
implied warranty of habitability, either statutorily or judicially
or both.5

The judiciary initiated acceptance of the doctrine in

twenty of these jurisdictions.6
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis.2d
590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961), is generally credited with the first
judicial exposition of an implied warranty of habitability in

5

See Appendix A for complete list of states which recognize
the doctrine of implied warranty of habitability.
6

See case citations in Appendix A for California, District of
Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin.
9

residential

leases.

This decision was followed by Lemle v.

Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 470, 474 (1969), where the court
unabashedly stated:
The application of an implied warranty of
habitability in leases gives recognition to the
changes in leasing transactions today. It
affirms the fact that a lease is, in essence,
a sale as well as a transfer of an estate in
land and is, more importantly, a contractual
relationship.
From
that
contractual
relationship
an
implied
warranty
of
habitability and fitness for the purposes
intended is a just and necessary implication.
It is a doctrine which has its counterparts in
the law of sales and torts and one which when
candidly countenanced is impelled by the nature
of the transaction and contemporary housing
realities.
Legal fictions and artificial
exceptions to wooden rules of property law
aside, we hold that in the lease of a dwelling
house, such as in this case, there is an
implied warranty of habitability and fitness
for the use intended.
The Javins decision, probably the most widely cited of all
these cases, followed

in 1970, and was quickly succeeded by

decisions in New Jersey, New Hampshire, Iowa, Illinois, Ohio,
Massachusetts, Washington, California, Kansas, New York, Indiana,
Texas, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania during the 1970's. Later,
courts in Vermont and Missouri joined the trend. While differing
3omewhat in scope of application and remedies, all these decisions
followed a similar pattern. They rejected traditional property law
analysis in favor of a contract based analysis, incorporated
relevant changes in other areas of law that had preceded the
iecision, and melded the analysis with legislative pronouncements
:hat concerned housing conditions. During this period, only a few
states

clung

to

the

traditional

doctrine

of

caveat

leasee:

U.abama, Arkansas, Colorado, Mississippi, and South Carolina.
in

Looking at the more recent decisions from Vermont and Missouri
is

instructive- In Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202 (Vt. 1984),

the Vermont Supreme Court explained how the recognition of an
implied warranty of habitability grew out of existing Vermont law.
prior case law had recognized that contracts contain interdependent
covenants and thus contract remedies are available for breaches of
a lease. The legislature had authorized the establishment of local
housing authorities to assure the existence of adequate housing.
State and local entities had adopted minimum housing standards.
Against this backdrop, the court recognized an implied warranty of
habitability and explained the tenant's remedies for its breach.
Ultimately, the court held that

M

[i]n light of these changes in

the relationship between tenants and landlords, it would be wrong
for the law to continue to impose the doctrine of caveat lessee on
residential leases.-

Id. at 207.

In 1984 the Missouri Supreme

Court, in Detlina v. Edelbrock, looked to prior Missouri cases
holding that a lease is both a contract and a conveyance, to cases
holding that a vendor/builder of a new home warrants the home's
fitness as a residence and to widespread adoption of housing codes
throughout the state as the basis for its adoption of a warranty
of habitability in residential leases.
This Court has in other legal settings recognized that a
landlord has a duty to provide a safe dwelling and that violations
of municipal housing codes are violations of the contract between
landlord and tenant,

gee Hall v. Warren (Hall I ) , 632 P.2d 848

(Utah 1981), and Hall v. Warren (Hall II), 692 P.2d 737 (Utah
1984). These holdings amount to a recognition that a landlord

11

warrants a habitable dwelling to a tenant, although without using
the rubric of "warranty of habitability."

This Court should

clearly establish that such a warranty of habitability inheres in
all residential leases in Utah and should recognize the breach of
such warranty as a defense in an action for unlawful detainer and
unpaid rent.
POINT II
THE LANDLORD'S MULTIPLE VIOLATIONS OF CITY
ORDINANCES CONSTITUTE A BREACH OF THE
RESIDENTIAL RENTAL AGREEMENT. THE TENANT SHOULD
BE ALLOWED TO RAISE ALL AVAILABLE CONTRACT
DEFENSES AND COUNTERCLAIMS IN AN UNLAWFUL
DETAINER ACTION SEEKING UNPAID RENT.
The landlord herein violated Salt Lake City building and
housing codes forty-two times and thus breached his contract with
the tenant; however the trial court decided this case by simply
looking

at

the

written

agreement

between

the

parties

and

defendant's admitted failure to pay rent. The court recognized no
legal significance in the testimony regarding the condition of the
premises and the landlord's violation of city ordinances.

The

trial court erroneously concluded that it could not -interfere" in
the -arrangement" entered into by the landlord and tenant

(R. 47,

T. 59). The tenant does not seek -interference- with but rather
enforcement of the contractual agreement between herself and her
landlord. By refusing to consider the tenant's contractual claims
as a basis for non-payment, the trial court erred.

This Court

should enforce a tenant's right to raise the landlord's breach of
as a defense or counterclaim in an unlawful detainer
action.

n

This Court has recognized that "the contemporary approach
toward leased habitations . . . emphasizes the contractual nature
of the relationship between the landlord and tenant . • .

H

and

has held that "the provisions of the city's housing code relating
to minimum housing standards were by implication read into and
became a part of the rental agreement" between landlord and tenant.
Hall I at 850. Three years later this Court reaffirmed its holding
that provisions of a building code adopted as an ordinance of a
city "are considered as much a part of the lease as if expressly
stated in the contract."

Hall II at 738.7

Therefore, by renting

a dwelling with numerous violations of the Salt Lake City housing
code, the landlord in this case breached the rental agreement with
this tenant.
In Hall I and Hall II this court held that such a violation
can give rise to an action for tort damages. This Court should now
establish that the landlord's violation of the contract gives rise
to traditional contract remedies as well. Such a conclusion is
consistent with Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d at 726, 727.

There

this court noted that M[l]andlord liability is no longer limited
by the artificial categories developed by the common law

....

Rather the lessee's rights, liabilities and expectations are more
appropriately viewed as governed by contract and general principles
of tort law" (emphasis added)•
Other jurisdictions that allow tenants to raise uninhabitable
conditions as a defense to eviction actions hav^ often relied upon

7

In the Hall cases tenants were entitled to maintain a tort
action against the landlord for injuries caused by a faulty floor
furnace in violation of Vernal City's building ordinances.
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such contractual theories.

In Javins, the court held that the

tenant's duty to pay rent and the landlord's duty to provide and
maintain a safe and healthy dwelling are mutually dependent.
Under contract principles . . . the tenant's
obligation to pay rent is dependent upon the
landlord's performance of his obligations,
including his warranty to maintain the premises
in habitable condition. In order to determine
whether any rent is owed to the landlord, the
tenants must be given an opportunity to prove
the housing code violations alleged as breach
of the landlord's warranty. 428 F.2d at 1082.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court similarly held that
M

the tenant's covenant to pay rent is dependent on the landlord's

implied warranty of habitability." Boston Housing Authority v.
Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 843 (Mass. 1973).

Once the contractual

nature of the relationship was recognized, that court necessarily
concluded that contractual remedies were available and identified
recision of the lease, rent withholding and rent abatement as
possible remedies.
Other jurisdictions have explored the nature and scope of
a tenant's contract remedies and have articulated various such
remedies. The tenant whose landlord fails to maintain the premises
in a habitable condition should be able to rescind the contract
without incurring further liability for rent (Teller v. McCoy, 253
S.E.2d 114 (W.Va. 1978), Hilder v. St.Peter, Pugh v. Holmes. 405
A.2d 897 (Pa. 1979), Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway. Lemle
y. Breeden, Pines v. Perssion. Marini v. Ireland. 56 N.J. 130, 265
A.2d 526 (1970)); deduct the costs necessary to make the dwelling
habitable (Pugh v. Holmes, Hilder v. si-. pptorr Marini v. Ireland^ ;
bring an action for damages (retroactive rent abatement) to be
1A

measured by the difference in value between the reasonable rental
value of the uninhabitable dwelling and the fair market rental rate
if the premises were as warranted (Green v. Superior Court, Boston
Housing Authority v. Hemingwayr Puah v, Holmes,

Hilder v. St.

Peter, King v> Moorehead); sue for specific performance (South
Austin Realty v, Sombriaht. 47 111. App.3d 89, 361 N.E.2d 795
(1977)); withhold rent and raise the landlord's breach in defense
to an action for summary dispossession I Green v. Superior Court,
Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, Detling v. Edelbrock, Pugh
v. Holmes, Hilder v. St. Peter, King v. Moorehead, Teller v.
McCoy); or sue for additional damages (Hilder v. St. Peter, Detling
v. Edelbrock, Old Town Development Company v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d
744 (Ind. App. 1976), vacated and dismissed as moot, 369 N.E.2d 404
(1977).

Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974)).

Having recognized violations of a building code as breaches
of the rental contract, this Court should now confirm that tenants
have contractual remedies for this breach and delineate those
remedies. Such an explanation would resemble the recent decision
in Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989),
wherein this court, by Justice Zimmerman, answered the related
question whether Utah common law imposes a duty upon landlords to
mitigate their damages by reletting after a tenant has wrongfully
breached a lease. In a footnote, the court stated that
modern landlord-tenant relationships • • . have
taken on substantive characteristics so similar
to commercial transactions that certain of the
legal principles developed in the law of
contracts in the context of commercial
transactions are now appropriately applied to
leases . . . . 776 P.2d at 902, n.3.

i<*

After reviewing the law from other jurisdictions, the court found
that "the principal justifications to support the traditional rule
are to a large extent anachronistic."

The court then reviewed the

analysis from related contract damage cases, discussed the policy
implications of a new rule, including the effects on the state and
national

economies,

commentators.

and

reviewed

the

thoughts

of

legal

The court then set forth the rule to be followed in

Utah and spelled out how the lessor's newly articulated mitigation
obligation is to be met. 776 P.2d at 905-06. The same type of
analysis should be utilized in the present case to articulate the
contract remedies for a tenant facing a breach by the landlord.
From a pleading perspective, raising any and all relevant
defenses or counterclaims in unlawful detainer cases has been
authorized by White v. District Court, 120 Utah 173, 232 P.2d 785
(1951), and Lincoln Financial Corp. v. Ferrier, 567 P.2d 1102 (Utah
1977).
These contract remedies are necessary because remedies now
available are simply inadequate to assure safe and decent housing
for tenants of landlords who refuse or fail to maintain their
premises.

The

presently

recognized

remedies

are

limited

to

constructive eviction,8 possible code enforcement by municipal
housing inspectors, and a tort action if the tenant is seriously
injured as a result of the housing code violations.
The constructive eviction defense is an impractical remedy in
that it requires the tenant to vacate the premises.

8

Brugger v.

See Backman, Landlord-Tenant Law; A Perspective on Reform in
Utah, 1981 Utah L. Rev. 727, 740.
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Fonoti, 645 P.2d 647 (Utah 1982). This is a burdensome requirement,
particularly for low income renters, those most often affected by
uninhabitable conditions. These tenants have difficulty in moving
because of a lack of affordable decent housing and their lack of
money for moving expenses and deposits.

As a result, those low

income tenants who do move often find themselves in another equally
dilapidated

dwelling*

Moveover,

constructive

eviction

is

unavailable in cases of "partial breach" where the housing is
clearly

inadequate,

but

where

a

partial

rental

payment

is

justified.
Housing code enforcement has been ineffective in remedying the
habitability problem, as the Javins court noted.

Failure of this

method stems from the courts' unwillingness to recognize housing
violations as crimes and to impose appropriate fines.9 When courts
do impose fines, they are often minimal and are simply treated as
a cost of doing business.

Even worse, if inspection results in a

condemnation, the tenant is again subjected to the problem of
finding another adequate and affordable dwelling.

A presidential

commission reported that inadequate enforcement has led to
thousands of landlords in disadvantaged
neighborhoods openly violating building codes
with impunity, thereby providing a constant
demonstration of flagrant discrimination by
legal authorities . . . . [I]n most cities, few
building code violations are corrected, even
when tenants complain directly to municipal
building departments • . • • [T]he open
violation of codes [acts] as a constant source
of distress to low-income tenants and creates
serious hazards to health and safety in
9

Gribetz and Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and
Remedies, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 1254, 1279, 1280 (1966); See also
Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant Remedies: An
Integration, 56 B.U.L. Rev. 1, 50-51 (1976).
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disadvantaged neighborhoods.
The speculative possibility of a tort action for serious
injuries to the tenant is clearly no answer to tenants' need for
safe dwellings.
Allowing the tenant to enforce contractual rights

gives the

best promise of meaningful enforcement of municipal building codes.
It avoids the tenant's

need to rely solely upon

inspectors to enforce the law.

overworked

It promotes enforcement before

serious injury has occurred. It allows the trial courts to fashion
appropriate, focused remedies to insure that unsafe conditions are
corrected and that the tenant pays a fair rent to allow necessary
repairs to be made.

Finally, recognizing traditional contract

remedies for this breach of contract is in keeping with basic legal
principles.
Likewise, public policy should not allow the landlord to claim
a waiver on the part of the tenant in order to avoid liability
mder the warranty of habitability doctrine. Most courts hold that
the warranty of habitability is applicable from the outset even
rhen the tenant enters into the lease agreement with knowledge of
idverse conditions in the dwelling.11 This result is only logical.
The Supreme Court of California in Knight v. Hallsthammar.
.71 Cal. Rptr. 707, 623 P.2d 268, 273 (1981), addressed this issue
lirectly:

Report of the National Advisory
disorders 472 (Bantam ed., 1968).
11

Commission

on

Civil

See, e.g., King v. Moorehead. 495 S.W.2d at 75; Glvco v.
chultz, 289 N.E.2d 919, 925 (Sylvania Mun. Ct. 1972); Foisv v.
vman, 515 P.2d 160, 164 (Wash. 1973); Boston Housing Authority v.
emingway, 293 N.E.2d at 843.
IB

[T]he fact that a tenant was or was not aware of
specific defects is not determinative of the duty
of a landlord to maintain premises which are
habitable.
The same reasons which imply the
existence of the warranty of habitability - the
inequality of bargaining power, the shortage of
housing, and the impracticability of imposing upon
tenants a duty of inspection - also compel the
conclusion that a tenant's lack of knowledge of
defects is not a prerequisite to the landlord's
breach of the warranty.
The opinion there also rejected, as inconsistent with Green. any
duty on the tenant to inspect for defects which may render the
premises uninhabitable and reversed a jury instruction which barred
the warranty defense for failure to inspect.

Id. at 273 n.5.

Thus, the trial court's determination here that the tenant waived
her warranty of habitability defense (T. 59) misstates the law and
public policy and should be overturned.
The Knight court also spoke to another issue in the present
case, the change of ownership during the tenancy. The court there
H

stated that
against

a

a tenant may defend an unlawful detainer action

current

owner

.

.

. despite

the

fact

that

the

uninhabitable conditions first existed under a former owner". 623
P.2d at 275.
POINT III
RECOGNITION OF A CONTRACTUAL REMEDY FOR
UNINHABITABLE PREMISES IS CONSISTENT WITH
THE DEVELOPING COMMON LAN, AND RECENT
LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS AND COMPORTS WITH THE
PROPER ROLE OF THE COURT.
The majority in the Court of Appeals decision recognized that
the court has inherent power to change "the judge-made rules at
issue in this case." However, that majority -abstained" from doing
so due to a mistaken belief that "the Legislature is better able

1Q

to undertake such a revision" of what "judges of yesteryear have
written."

778 P.2d at 13 n.5.

That majority entertained a

mistaken belief that this case requires a "single precipitous leap"
to create a "new rule of . . . [broad] scope". 778 P.2d at 13.
In fact, the most important common law rights at issue here
have already been recognized by this Court. The narrow questions
presented in this case involve delineating remedies rather than
creating new rights. This case requires only that this Court "fill
in gaps between related laws," 778 P.2d at 13, a proper and
necessary role for the courts.

This Court has recognized no

doctrine that would require or even suggest restraint or inaction
here.
A.

It is this Court's Province to Develop the
Common Law.

The Court of Appeals properly recognized that this case
presents a question of common law.

The court's scope in changing

the common law is broad and requires no deference to a legislature:
M

[T]his Court may alter . . . an interpretation of the common law

. . . to conform with evolving standards and changing times."
Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Co., 740 P.2d 1281, 1283 (Utah
1987).
The tenant's common law right to live in a safe, habitable
dwelling and her contractual right to an apartment that conforms
with city ordinances have already been established by this Court.
See Hall I, Hall II and Stephenson v. Warner, 581 P.2d 567 (Utah
1978).

The only remaining question is whether the tenant should

have a contractual remedy to enforce that right.

The tenant does

not seek a "precipitous leap" of law, but rather the logical
on

application of traditional contract remedies to the present breach
of an established contractual and common law duty.
B.

Legislative Acts in Utah Suggest that
this Court Should Recognize a Warranty of
Habitability and Grant a Contractual
Remedy for its Breach,

"It has always been the duty of the common-law court to
perceive

the

impact

of major

legislative

innovation

and to

interweave the new legislative policies with the inherited body of
common law principles . . . ." Moraane v. State Marine Lines 398
U.S. 375, 392 (1970).

See also Peters, Common Law Judging in a

Statutory Worldt An Address, 43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 995, 998 (1982)
and Stone, The Common Law in the United States 50 Harv. L. Rev. 4,
13 (1936).
In Utah, a variety of state and local legislative actions
indicate a public policy favoring safe, habitable housing.

Since

1969 the Utah legislature has consistently stated a policy to
provide safe and sanitary housing for the citizens of this state
and to upgrade housing that does not meet minimum standards of
habitability. In that year the legislature authorized the creation
of local housing authorities and stated in Utah Code S55-18-1:
It is declared to be the policy of the state of Utah
to promote the general welfare of its citizens that
it is necessary to remedy the unsafe and unsanitary
housing conditions and the acute shortage of decent,
safe, and sanitary dwellings for families of medium
and low income, in urban and rural areas. These
conditions cause an increase and spread of disease
and crime, and constitute a menace to the health,
safety, morals, and welfare of the state. The
provision
of
safe
and
sanitary
dwelling
accommodations at rents or prices which persons of
medium and low income can afford will materially
assist in developing more desirable neighborhoods
and alleviating the effects of poverty in this
SUuLC

. . . .
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In 1975/ the Utah Housing Finance Agency was created and again
the legislature set forth the policy of this state:
I., is declared that the policy of the state of
Utah is to assure the health, safety and
welfare of its citizens, that an adequate
supply of decent, safe and sanitary housing is
essential to the well-being of the citizens of
the state • . • •
It is found and declared that there continues
to exist throughout the state a seriously
inadequate supply of safe and sanitary dwelling
accommodations within the financial means of
persons and families of low and moderate income
•

• • •

Jtah Code §63-44a-2
In

1977,

the

legislature

adopted

the

Utah

Residential

lehabilitation Act, Utah Code §11-25-1, to upgrade residential
>roperties in deteriorating areas. In 1987 the legislature created
.he Housing Development Restricted Account and authorized its board
o expend monies appropriated for rehabilitation of low-income
ousing units and -other activities that will assist in improving
he availability or quality of housing in the state for low-income
ersons." Utah Code §55-18a-105.
Finally, in 1989, the legislature directed the statewide
doption of the Uniform Building Code, the National Electrical
Dde, the Uniform Plumbing Code, and the Uniform Mechanical Code,
iah Code §58-56-4, and established a new agency, the Uniform
lilding Code Commission, to oversee the implementation of these
>des.
In addition to these state pronouncements, all counties have
tablished boards of health which have general responsibility for
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sanitation abatement.

Many cities, including Salt Lake City and

Ogden, have adopted local ordinances such as the Uniform Housing
Code, the Uniform Code for the Abatement of Dangerous Buildings and
others.

Salt Lake City's ordinances, which were violated by the

landlord in this case, are also legislative acts which are entitled
to enforcement.12
The Utah Court of Appeals, in -deferring-

to the state

legislature here, failed to recognize these significant legislative
actions which both state and city governments have taken. These
actions clearly express a policy of safe, habitable housing which
would be advanced by recognizing the tenant's right to enforce that
policy in an unlawful detainer action.
Courts in other states have focused on such legislative
pronouncements to determine how the common law is to be developed.
For example, the court in Teller v. McCoy. 253 S.E.2d at 122,
stated that "[t]he Legislature has clearly embarked on a course to
change the common-law no-repair rule and its correlative doctrine
of caveat emptor by recognizing that urban tenants seek not just
space, but a habitable place to live (emphasis in original).H
The court then quoted the Pines case, stating that "[t]o follow
the old rule of no implied warranty of habitability in leases
would, in our opinion, be inconsistent with the current legislative
policy concerning housing standards." Similar statements can be
found in Pugh, 405 A.2d at 905, and in Boston Housing Authority v.

12

-This Court has frequently stated that the enactment of
zoning laws and ordinances is the exercise of a legislative
function.Wilson v. Manning, 657 P.2d 251, 253 (Utah 1982)
(citations omitted).
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Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d at 841, among other cases.

C.

Mo Doctrine of "Judicial Abstention" or
"Restraint" is Relevant Here.

Neither the "haphazard" unavailability of appellate cases nor
the court's

"limited means of gathering

information"

justify

"deference" to the legislature in this case. Nor does any doctrine
of judicial restraint justify denying the tenant the remedy she
seeks.
The Court of Appeals abstained from altering antiquated common
law in part because

"the judiciary is . . . limited by the

happenstances that bring cases into appellate litigation . . . " 778
P. 2d

at

13.

That

court

wrongly

assumed

that

because

of

"happenstance," "[i]t has taken all of those almost thirty years
[of doctrinal development in this area] for a single case to arrive
at a Utah appellate court and squarely present the issue." 778 P.2d
at 13 n. 8. However, it was litigation strategy and the appellate
process for unlawful detainer actions rather than "happenstance,"
rtiich generally prevented such cases from being brought before an
tppellate court of record prior to 1987, when the Utah Court of
appeals was created and given jurisdiction over appeals from the
ircuit courts.13

Now a body of consistent law in the landlord

enant area is likely to develop.

Procedural advantages motivate most landlords to file
rilawful detainer actions in the circuit courts.
Until 1987
ppeals from these actions were heard by the district courts and
leir decisions were not published. This procedural anomaly best
cplains why the courts' consideration of the relationship between
indlord and tenant has arisen most often in the context of tort
rtions. See e.g. English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154 (Utah App.
189).
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Although perhaps never squarely presented, this Court has
flirted with the concept of an implied warranty of habitability at
least as far back as 1978 when, in Barlow v. Keener, No. 15609
(Utah Dec. 1, 1978), Justice Hall stated in dissent that once a
plaintiff in an unlawful detainer action had made a claim for
unpaid rent, the defendant could properly assert the defense of
warranty of habitability.

Slip op. at 3 (Hall, J., dissenting).

In that unpublished case, the majority explicitly chose not to deal
with

the

question

of

the

availability

of

the

warranty

of

habitability defense.
As Judge Garff pointed out in his present dissent, this Court
declined to rule on the question again in 1981 in Hall I, "because
of the abbreviated briefing on the issue". 778 P.2d at 16 (Garfff
J., dissenting).

When that case came before this Court after

remand, the Court again declined to consider the question, stating,
"in view of our resolution of the above issue, we need not reach
the issue of whether there is a duty imposed on a landlord by an
implied warranty of habitability . . . ." Hall II at 739. Again,
in a slightly different context, this Court noted that -we do not
decide the issue of whether this jurisdiction would recognize a
cause of action for breach of implied or express warranties of safe
accommodation

and habitability

. . . . - Mitchell v. Pearson

Enterprises. 697 P.2d 240, 247 (Utah 1985).
Finally, in Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d at 726, this Court
held that "Utah has not held that there is an implied warranty of
habitability in residential leases, and we decline to address the
issue now because it has not been raised but . . . [l]andlord
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liability

is no longer

limited by the artificial

developed by the common law."

categories

This issue is now squarely raised.

The Utah Court of Appeals' concern with the courts' "limited
means of gathering the broad information necessary," 778 P.2d at
13, is illusory.

The information necessary to evaluate this

development in the law has been collected and reported in various
studies.14

The Heskin study, which surveyed California courts

following that state's recognition of this warranty, determined
that:
1. Green is being employed more often and violations of
the warranty occur less often than assumed.
2. The use of the warranty does not affect the housing
market•
3. The warranty is leading to the repair of property and
could assist code enforcement if knowledge of it
spreads•
4. Tenants who remain in possession do not have their
rents substantially raised.
5. Most tenants or their lawyers are not inclined to
abuse the law.
Heskin, The Warranty of Habitability Debate at 67.
Moreover,

since

the warranty

of

habitability

was

first

recognized almost thirty years ago, more and more states have
adopted it. Today forty-two states recognize this doctrine. That
Eact alone indicates that it has been a workable change in the law.
No principle of judicial restraint justifies denying the
ippellant the remedy she seeks. This Court has relied upon certain

14

See, e.g., Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on
ehalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income
edistribution Policy, 80 Yale L.J. 1093 (1971); Heskin, The
arrantv of Habitability Debate:
A California Case Study, 66
alif. L. Rev. 37 (1978).
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well-settled principles of restraint, including stare decisis and
settled interpretations of statutes, in modifying and enunciating
rights and remedies.15

In considering whether to recognize a new

cause of action this Court has also practiced judicial restraint,
where the parameters of new rights and obligations are difficult
to predict.

None of these principles justifies a ruling in favor

of the landlord here.
The principle of stare decisis applies once a court has duly
considered and decided an issue.

Thereafter, the court should

generally follow its own precedent, even if new arguments are made
against it.16

This Court has stated M[The precedent] is, in any

event, a reasoned determination persuasively based on prior Utah
authorities and, in its own right, now embedded in the law of this
state for many years.

Such precedents should not be overruled

except for the most compelling reasons . . . . H Wilson v. Manning,
657 P.2d at 254.
Here the principle of stare decisis does not apply.
a case of first impression.

This is

The issue has never had the benefit

of a reasoned determination by this Court.

The existence of an

unexamined practice is due no deference by this Court.
In deferring to the state legislature, it is possible that the
Court of Appeals believed statutory interpretation was at issue

15

The Court of Appeals in this case cited several cases which
discuss th^se principles.
16

See J. P. Stevens, The Life Span of a Judae-Made Rule, 58
N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1, 9 (1983). Justice Stevens there summarized the
considerations to address• in overruling a case: Mthe possible
significance of intervening events, the possible impact on settled
expectations, and the risk of undermining public confidence in the
stability of our basic rules of law."
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here.

778 P.2d at 13 n.5, citing Hackford v. Utah Pnwer & Light

Co., 740 P.2d at 1283, and Mickelsen v. Craigco Inc., 767 P.2d 561
(Utah 1989).

Where a court has interpreted a statute, that

interpretation is entitled to even greater deference than the
court's common law precedent.17

But here there has been no

judicial interpretation of a statute, so no judicial interpretation
has been woven into the law or commands any deference.

Nor are

there statutory formalities that only the legislature can revoke.
See Mickelsen v. Craigco Inc., 767 P.2d at 565.18

If anything,

this Court's recognition of a remedy to enforce rights recognized
by this Court and promoted by various

state

laws and city

ordinances will provide harmony and consistency in the law.
The United States Supreme Court discussed the most important
reason for the rule of stare decisis:

-the desirability that the

law furnish a clear guide for the conduct of individuals, to enable
them to plan their affairs with assurance against untoward surprise
. . . ."

Moragne 398 U.S. at 403.19

Justice Zimmerman expressed

the same concern for proceeding "with care" in developing the
common law:
[T]he lead opinion completely fails to
establish
predictable
guidelines
for
17

Nevertheless, even statutory interpretations can be altered
depending upon their "plausibility", the degree to which the
interpretation has been "woven into the fabric of the law" and the
strength of the argument for change. Hackford. 740 P.2d at 1283,
1285.
18

This was a valid concern in Mickelsen because the court
alone was unable to "eliminate . . . statutory formalities and
bring consistency and clarity to this area by judicial fiat."
767 P.2d at 565 (Zimmerman, J., concurring).
19

Moragne overruled The Harrisburg case decided in 1886, and
recognized an action for wrongful death under general maritime law.
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determining what that duty is and when an
employer can be found to owe such a duty to an
employee . . . . [T]he cost of uncertainty for
employers is simply too great to justify
creation of the cause of action proposed by the
lead opinion."
Berube v. Fashion Centre Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1051-52 (Utah
1989) (Zimmerman concurring in the result).20 In Moragne, as in this
case -the confidence of people in their ability to predict the
legal consequences of their actions . . . is threatened least by
a new remedial rule to effectuate well-established primary rules
of behavior.M

398 U.S. at 403 (emphasis added).

Here, too, tenant seeks simply a remedial rule.
there are well-established

rules of behavior.

Here, too,

Landlords are

already obligated by city ordinance to maintain safe, habitable
dwellings. Their failure to do so can result in tort liability or
in city demolition of the property.

Recognition of the -remedial

rule19 that uninhabitable living conditions can be raised as a
contract defense by a tenant exposed to those conditions
impose no new, unpredictable obligation on the landlord.

would
In this

case there can be no mystery as to what duty is owed and no new
uncertainty will be imposed.
In conclusion, there is no justification for deferring to the
legislature to enforce appellant's rights here. There has already
been legislative action to promote safe habitations, and this Court
has already decided closely related issues regarding landlords'

In Berube, this Court altered the common law regarding
employment at will to recognize an employee's right to enforce
covenants implied in the employment contract.
However, three
justices refused to change the common law to establish a more
general and less predictable -covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.-
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duties.

Other courts have chosen this route as well.

See Jack

Soring. Inc. v. Little, 50 111.2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Pugh
v. Holmes. 405 A.2d at 903-09. According to Judge Roger Traynor,
courts are not "bound to maintain [the law they have made until]
the legislature undertakes to unmake it.H Traynor, Reasoning in a
Circle of Law. 56 Va. L. Rev. 739, 745 (1970).

Rather, as Judge

Keeton has argued, when courts can alter rules in the service of
legal principles, Hcourts have both the power to overrule and the
responsibility for exercising that power."
to do Justice:

R. Keeton, Venturing

Reforming Private Law 22, (1969).
CONCLUSION

Tenant sought to raise as a defense to an unlawful detainer
iction her landlord's failure to comply with applicable building
tnd housing codes and the uninhabitable condition of her dwelling.
fncontroverted evidence showed the existence of numerous code
iolations.

These codes are a part of the lease between the

arties by operation of law.

This Court should declare that a

arranty of habitability exists in all residential leases, should
ecognize that the breach of such warranty or the breach of the
sntal contract through violations of housing codes may be raised
s a defense to an action for unlawful detainer, and should
rticulate the additional remedies available to tenants in this
tuation.
Petitioner Oliver asks this Court to reverse the trial court's
dgment and remand the case for calculation of damages on her
fenses and counterclaim.
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DATED this 15th day of November, 1989.
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.

\JL

:

BRUCE PLENK

LINDA F. SMITH
Attorneys for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 15th day of November, 1989, I
mailed four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellant to James H. Deans, Attorney for Respondent, 440 South
700 East, #101, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.

<w*.

bp\oliver5.bri
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APPENDIX A
STATES WHICH RECOGNIZE THE DOCTRINE OF
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
Judicially Adopt-OH.
California:
^
^
^
(West 1974,

704, 517
* -fr*1fi,SS1941, 1942

)# Q&1

'

c v

District of
Columbia:
)# SSS

^'

(1970)

£&&§&* 400 U.S. 925

Georgia:

Givens v. Gray, 126 Ga. App. 309 1IQQ
c . ,,
607 (1972)
' 9 0 s«B.2d

Hawaii:

Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 462 P 2d 470
(1969); Haw. Rev. st»»..r S521-42; S521 - 61
through 78 (Supp. 1974)

Illinois!

Jack Spring. Inc. v. Little. 50 111.2d 351, 280
N.E.2d 208 (1972) (limited to existence of
municipal building code)
Extended to all
leases regardless of codes by Glasoe v.
Trinkle. 479 N.E.2d 915 (111. 1985)

Indiana:

Old Town Development Co. v. Langford. 349
N.E.2d 744 (Ind.App. 1976), vacated and
dismissed as moot, 369 N.E.2d 404 (1977)

Iowa:

Mease v. Fox. 200 N.W.2d 791 (1972); Iowa Code
Ann. S562 A (West 1979)

Kansas:

Steele v. Latimer. 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304
(1974) codified in Kan. Stat. Ann. S58-2553(a)
(1975)

Massachusetts\

Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway. 363
Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973); and Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann.. ch. 239, S8A (West Stpp. 1974)

Michigan:

Rome v. Walker. 38 Mich. App. 458, 196 N.W.2d
850 (1972) Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.. S554.139
(West Supp. 1974)

Missouri:

Detlina v. Edelbrock. 671 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. 1984)

New Hampshire:

Kline v. Burns. Ill N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248
(1971); N.H. Rev.Stat. Ann. S540A 1-8 (1985)
A - 1

New Jersey:

Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526
(1970)

Ohio:

Glvco v. Schultz. 35 Ohio Misc. 25, 289 N.E.2d
919 (Sylvania Mun.Ct. 1972); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. SS5321.04, 5321.07 (Page Supp. 1974)

Pennsylvania:

Puah v. Holmes. 405 A.2d 897 (Pa. 1979)

Texas:

Kamarath v. Bennett. 568 S.W.2d 658 (Tex.
1978); Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 92.052 (Vernon
1984)

Vermont:

Hilder v. St. Peter. 478 A.2d 202 (1984);
(Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9 §4457-59 (1985)

Washington:

Foisv v. Wvman. 83 Wash.2d 22, 515 P.2d 160
(1973) (en banc)
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. S59.18 (Supp. 1974)1
Teller v. McCov. 162 W.V. at 367, 253 S.E.2d
114 (W.Va. 1978); W.Va. Code S37-6-30 (1988)

West Virginia:
Wisconsin:

Pines v. Perssion. 14 Wis.2d 590, 111 N.W.2d
409 (1961); but see. Posnanski v. Hood. 46
Wis.2d 172, 174 N.W.2d 528 (1970).

Legislatively Adopted!
Alaska:

Alaska Stat. SS34.03.100, 34.03.160,
34.03.180 (1974)

Arizona:

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. SS33-1324, 1361 (1973)

Connecticut:

Conn. Gen. Stat. SS47-24b (West 1969);
LeClair v. Woodward. 6 Conn.Cir. 727, 316 A.2d
791 (1970)

Delaware:

Del. Code Ann, tit. 25, S5303 (1981)

'lorida:

Fla. Stat. Ann. SS83.51, 83.56 (West 1981);
Mansur v. Eubanks. 401 So.2d 1328 (Fla. 1981)
construing the statute

daho:

Idaho Code S6-320 (1984)

entucky:

Kv. Rev. Stat. Ann. SS383.500 to 383.515 (1974)
(URLTA adopted)

aine:

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann, tit. 14, S6021 (1989)

iryland:

Md. Real Prop. Code Ann. S8-211 (Supp. 1986)
A - 2

Minnesota:

Minn. Stat. Ann. S504.18 (West 1971),
applied in Fritz v. Warthen, 298 Minn. 54, 213
N.W.2d 339 (1973)

Montana:

Mont. Code Ann. SS42-420 and 42-426 (1977)

Nebraska:

Neb. Rev, Stat. §§76-1419, 76-1425, et seq.

Nevada:

Nev. Rev. Stat. SH8A.290 (1970) (but note that
the act does not protect tenants whose landlord
owns fewer than seven units)

New Mexico:

N.M. Stat. Ann. §§70-7-1 (1975) and N.M.
Stat. Ann. §§47-8-1 to -51 (1978) (URLTA
adopted)

New York:

N.Y. Real Prop. Law §§235-b (McKinney 1975)

North Carolinai

N.C. Gen. Stat. §42-42(a)(l) (1984)

North Dakota:

N.D. Cent. Code §47-16-13.1 (1977)

Oklahoma:

Okla. Stat. Ann, tit. 41f §118 (West 1978)

Oregon:

Or. Rev. Stat. §§91.770, 91.800-.815 (1974)
(URLTA adopted); L & M Investment Co. v.
Morrison. 286 Or. 397# 594 P.2d 1238 (1979),
upholding
and
interpreting
habitability
sections of statute.

Rhode Island:

R.I. Gen. Laws §§34-18-1 to -56 (1987) (URLTA
adopted)

South Carolina:

S.C. Code Ann. §27-40-440 (Law Co-op.Cum.Supp.
1987)

Tennessee:

Tenn. Code Ann. §§66-28-101 through 516 (1975)

Virginia:

Va. Code Ann. §§55-248.2 to -248.40 (1988)
(URLTA adopted)

NOTE: URLTA, the Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act, includes
a warranty of habitability at Sections 2.14 and 4.105.
No Warranty of Habitability
Alabama
Arkansas
Colorado
Louisiana
Mississippi
South Dakota
Utah
Wyoming
A - 3

ADDENDUM

Chapter 11
HOUSING
Sections:
5-11-1.
5-11-2.
5-11-3.
5-11-4.
5-11-5.
5-11-6.
5-11-7.
5-11-8.
5-11-9.

Uniform Housing Code and Uniform Code for the Abatement oi
Dangerous Buildings adopted.
Governing body.
Housing inspection fees.
Housing Advisory and Appeals Board.
Conduct of hearing appeals.
Performance of abatement work.
Recovery of cost of repair or demolition.
Conditional permit for temporary securing.
Public nuisance and administrative review.

Sec. 5-11-1. Uniform Housing Code and Uniform Code for the Abatement
of Dangerous Buildings adopted. The Uniform Housing Code, 1982 edition,
hereinafter sometimes referred to as "UHC", and the Uniform Code for the
Abatement of Dangerous Buildings, 1982 edition, hereinafter sometimes
referred to as "UCADB", are hereby adopted by Salt Lake City as the
ordinances, rules, and regulations of said City, subject to the amendments and
exceptions thereto as hereinafter set out: three copies of said codes shall be
filed for use and examination by the public in the office of the City Recorder of
Salt Lake City. The purpose of these codes is to provide minimum
requirements for the protection of life, limb, health, property, safety, and
welfare of the general public and the owners and occupants of buildings within
Salt Lake City and providing for correction of violations thereof. Hereafter all
references in the revised ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah 1965, to the
Uniform Housing Code and Uniform Code for the Abatement of Dangerous
Buildings, 1976 editions adopted by Section 5-11-1 are amended and deemed
to read the Uniform Housing Code, 1982 edition and Uniform Code for the
Abatement of Dangerous Buildings, 1982 edition.
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UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
Attorneys for Defendant
BY: BRUCE PLENK #2613
124 South 400 East, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-8891
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

P. H. INVESTMENT,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CATHY OLIVER,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Civil No. 873-2236CV

Defendant.
*

The above-entitled action came on regularly for trial on ti

1
I
>

5th day of March, 1987, the Honorable Robert C. Gibson presiding
Plaintiff appeared by its agent Stan Secor and by counsel James
H. Deans.

Defendant appeared in person and by counsel Bruce

Plenk of Utah Legal Services, Inc.

The court having heard

arguments and testimony, considered the evidence and good cause
appearing, now enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 1^
as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The court has jurisdiction over the parties and subj^J

matter of this action.
2.

Plaintiff is the owner of real property located at 22

Iowa Street, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah.

ADDENDUM
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N

3

3.

Plaintiff is the successor in interest to the rental

agreement entered into between Rainier Huck and defendant*
4.

Defendant rented the premises on or about November 1,

1986, and at that time the premises were in a dangerous and
deteriorated condition which was never repaired by Plaintiff's
initial landlord, Rainier Huck, or by Plaintiff,

Defendant

testified that the condition of the premises at the time of tria
was as bad as the condition on November 1, 1986.
5.

Defendant has failed to pay the monthly rental for

February, 1987.
6.

Defendant was served a 3-Day Notice to Pay Rent or

Vacate on or about February 6, 1987.
7.

Defendant is currently occupying the premises in

unlawful detainer.
8.

There is no document in evidence that would allow for

an award of attorneyfs fees to either party.
9.

Defendant called as a witness Mr. William Cupit, an

enforcement officer with nine years1 experience employed by the
Salt Lake City Building and Housing Services who testified that
he inspected the premises on February 19, 1987, and at that time
there were 42 violations of the Uniform Housing Code and the
Uniform Code for the Abatement of Dangerous Buildings, both of
which have been incorporated into the ordinances of Salt Lake
City.

Mr. Cupit testified that on the date of his inspection anc

for a lengthy period of time before that day the building was
substandard and dangerous, a public nuisance and subject to
abatement by repair, rehabilitation or demolition.

10-

Mr. Cupit testified that he would close the building tj

occupancy if it were vacant and that he advised the Defendant to
attempt to relocate*

He further testified that on March 3, 1987,

he sent formal notice to Plaintiff to repair or demolish the
building*
11.

Defendant testified that when she rented the building

she was not aware of the extent and nature of the code violation}
and that she could not afford other housing nor could she now
afford to move.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The court will not interfere in the contractual ar-

rangement entered into by defendant and plaintifffs assignor.
2.

Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against Defendant in

the sum of $80.36 for rent from February 1, 1987, through February 9, 1987, and for treble damages in the sum of $630.00 from
February 10, 1987, through March 6, 1987, and for costs of court
of $19.35, together with an Order of Restitution for the premises.

Defendant is to receive an offset of $200.00 against this

judgment representing her deposit.
3.

Defendant's counterclaim should be dismissed with

prejudice.
4.

Defendant is not entitled to any offset against rent

which she owes based on her defense of a breach of an implied
warranty of habitability by Plaintiff nor is she entitled to
recover any damages for Plaintiff's beach of an implied warranty
of habitability because the Supreme Court of this state has nev^f
delineated such a defense or cause of action.

5.

Defendant has waived any defense or cause of action

under a theory of warranty of habitability by her agreeing to
rent the premises in their deteriorated condition.
DATED this

/7

day of / t 2 / ^ W * Q

1987.

ROBERT C. GIBSON
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was mailed
first class to James H. Deans, Attorney for Plaintiff, 175
South Main* Suite 500, Salt Lake,, City, Utah 84111.
DATED this<

day of vuJ f^LLry^jH^ , 1987.

K

fY\iLLu.^ii'JL
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UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
Attorneys for Defendant
BY: BRUCE PLENK #2613
124 South 400 East, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-8891
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

P. H. INVESTMENT,

*
*

*
Plaintiff,

CORRECTED JUDGMENT

»

vs.
CATHY OLIVER,

*
*

*
Defendant.

Civil No. 873-2236CV

*
*

The above-entitled action came on regularly for trial the
5th day of March, 1987, the Honorable Robert C. Gibson presiding
and plaintiff appearing by its agent Stan Secor and by counsel j
James H. Deans and defendant appearing in person and by counsel'
Bruce Plenk and the court having entered its Findings of Fact anj
i
Conclusions of Law and good cause appearing, now,
j
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:
1.

Possession of the premises at 224 Iowa Street, Salt

i
i

Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah, be delivered to the plaintiff
and that the defendant and the defendants property (and all
persons claiming a right to occupancy through defendant) be
removed from the premises.

All rights to occupancy through

defendant arising from the Rental Agreement are terminated, and

the Sheriff or Constable is dir-^^ *
8Cted t0 e t t C U
i*^el,
"

m

'

'

—

II

2.
Plaintiff i s entitle, to Jud^ent agai„st Defendant i n
« * sun, of *80.36 for rent fron, February 1 1 9 8 7 t th hr or u hh
arv 9 1987 , „ H *
'
9 February 9, 1987, and for treble damaoes lin
t ..
n t hke s u n
'
°* S630.00 froni
February 10. 1 9 8 7 . through „ar oh ,. „ „ , ^
~
« « , . „ . to9ether with an Order of sestltution for the p r U T
... Pendant is to re=eiye an offset of «00.00 against this
iud^ent represents her deposit. P i a i n t i f f i s t h u s
judgment of $529.71.
3. Defendant's Counterclaim^ dismissed with prejudice
DATED this _ / 6 _ day of
2 ^ ^ T
^

KUtiEKT C. GIBSON*
CIRCUIT; COURT JUDGE
CERTIFICATE o p MAIETMB*',.

ing

CORSOTS S S D S S O T * ^

maiSd ? ? r ^ ° ^ e C t ?° P y

DATED t h i S c 2 £ ^ d a y of'

Q&4&
bMj

bp/oliver.jud
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1987.

of

the

fo

«gc

